


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UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY

Washington, D.C. 20451

OFFICE OF
THE DIRECTOR

August 19, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Robert M. Kimmitt,
Executive Secretary, National Security Council

Charles Hill,
Executive Secretary, Department of State

Colonel John H. Stanford,
Executive Secretary, Department of Defense

Executive Secretary, Central Intelligence Agency

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SUBJECT: Responses to Questions from the Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence

Attached are proposed responses to written questions submitted by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence in connection with the Director's June 16 meeting with the Committee. Because of their relevance to ongoing negotiations and deliberations in the Congress on the defense budget, we would appreciate your clearances before we transmit them to the SSCI. Request your agency's clearances by COB August 25, 1983.

W B Staples
William B. Staples
Executive Secretary

Attachment:
As stated

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Q1a. What is your reading of the official Soviet reaction to the President's new offer based on exchanges in Geneva and high-level diplomatic channels or on any intelligence data?

A. The official Soviet response to the revised US proposal has been largely critical and polemical. The modified US position has been described as "movement within" the US position in order to accomodate plans to build up the US strategic arsenal, specifically, highly-accurate Midgetman ICBMs. They state that the artificial distinction between ballistic missiles and bombers remains and that the US still seeks to eliminate the sides' freedom to determine the composition of their forces for themselves, aiming directly at a restructuring of Soviet strategic forces. They summarize the changes in the US approach, as reflected in the US draft treaty, as formalistic, with the main substance of the US approach untouched.

In informal conversations, Soviet delegates have repeated these arguments but with less rigidity. Two examples illustrate this point: on July 7, Karpov told Rowny that the tabling of the US draft treaty was a positive step; on July 14, one Soviet delegate stated that the Soviets understood there could be no treaty unless some mutually-acceptable approach to throw-weight was worked out.

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Q1b. Do you expect a Soviet counterproposal, or are they likely to stonewall for a while and blame the lack of progress on "unrealistic" US demands?

A. We believe that our firm, yet serious, position on throw-weight limits and the two successive favorable votes on the Peacekeeper missile will convince the Soviets that it is in their interest to consider reducing destabilizing systems and to agree to overall aggregate limits which will enhance strategic stability. "Stonewalling", in my view, characterizes well the Soviet attitude during the first three rounds of START. During Round IV, the Soviets tabled additional detail elaborating their proposal and provided alternatives to earlier positions which were clearly unacceptable constraints on US force modernization; we hope this indicates a Soviet intention to show some flexibility and to move the negotiations forward.

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Q2. It has been suggested by several observers in and out of Government that it is simply not in the Soviet interest to reach an accord on strategic arms before they see how the INF negotiations and missile deployments pan out. Indeed, some have gone so far as to postulate that the Soviets may be unwilling to agree to even token limitations, such as some of the CBMs which have been discussed in either the START or INF negotiations. According to this thesis, any such signs of progress in Soviet-American relations would quell European suspicions about the Reagan Administration's commitment to arms control and thereby facilitate the deployment of INF missiles later this year. Do you share these pessimistic assessments? Are the Soviets really interested in reaching a START agreement at this time?

A. The Soviets undoubtedly have similar objectives in START and INF--a desire to impede or halt US and Alliance modernization programs, and thus to maintain or achieve military superiority in LRINF systems, and if possible, strategic systems. And, it is clear that we are currently at a critical juncture with regard to completing and implementing US strategic and NATO INF modernization programs.

As the Soviets become increasingly convinced of US and Western resolve to carry through with these necessary modernization programs, they will have a greater incentive to negotiate serious arms control agreements that go beyond token limits, and confidence-building measures which can reduce the risk of war and uncertainty, especially during times of tension and crisis.

With respect to START, I believe that the Soviets are interested in achieving progress toward an agreement at this

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time. Although the sides are still far apart on some fundamental issues, both sides have tabled draft treaties, and specific provisions are being discussed. The Soviets have for the first time proposed real reductions in strategic systems, and have begun to fill in details of their proposal. These are positive signs. It is our hope that the Soviets will continue to show seriousness of purpose in START.

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Q3a. Part of the Soviet proposal calls for an unspecified ceiling on the total number of warheads on missiles and bombs on aircraft. While no specific figure has been advanced, its level has been linked to the way cruise missiles are handled in an overall agreement. Have the Soviets ever hinted how low they would be willing to go on their force loading limit?

A. The Soviets have stated that their weapons ceiling would be lower than the current US level, but they have given no specific figure. They have stated that the level would depend upon the sides counting all weapons (ballistic missile warheads and bomber weapons) in a single aggregate. While the Soviets say the level will be below current US levels, they have recently suggested counting rules which attribute 12,000 to 13,000 weapons to US strategic forces, this may foreshadow that their proposed level would require little or no reduction from current actual levels.

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Q3b. Is there any indication that the Soviets would accept some sort of sublimit on ICBM warheads as part of an overall missile warhead limit, let alone one as low as the 2,500 level which we are still proposing--which would require them to take a 50 percent cut in ICBMs and ICBM warheads while we are allowed an increase of 13 percent.

A. The Soviets have proposed a sublimit on MIRVed ICBMs of 680. They have also proposed ICBM fractionation limits for both existing types and one new type along the lines of SALT II. Although they have not indicated a willingness to accept a direct sublimit on ICBM warheads, their current proposal implicitly accepts (as in SALT II) a maximum limit on the number of ICBM warheads.

However, under their current proposal, the theoretical ceiling would be very high, on the order of about 7,900 ICBM warheads. As of this date, the Soviets have tested one new type of MIRVed ICBM, the SS-X-24, and a ten RV version of that missile is projected for the mid-1980s by the Intelligence Community. Based on Soviet statements in Geneva, their current draft treaty, and intelligence forecasts, we do not know whether the Soviets would, in the end, accept a 50 percent cut or even a substantial cut in their deployed ICBM warheads. The US, of course, under its proposal would have to take a 50 percent cut in its SLBM warheads to maintain its current level of ICBM warheads. To date they have opposed the US proposal but indicated willingness to make some reduction.

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Q4. Have we made any progress in talks with the Soviets about reaching some kind of CBM agreement separate from, and indeed, as a means to facilitate conclusion of, a START Treaty?

A. The sides are making some degree of progress in the CBM area. Both sides have put forth proposals to form a CBM Working Group to negotiate specific agreed confidence-building measures within the overall START framework. The remaining point at issue in agreeing to a mandate is whether CBM provisions must be part of a START agreement (the Soviet position) or whether the final form of agreement could be determined later (the US position). The formation of the group early next round could provide impetus to the overall START negotiations, as well as result in early agreement on CBMs that can enhance security and crisis stability. We have argued that the sides can later agree on the final form of an agreement, and, in fact, an earlier separate agreement could be folded into a final START agreement. As of the end of Round IV, the Soviets refuse any format other than theirs.

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Q.5. Have we broached with the Soviets the idea of reaching some agreement on improving crisis communications and taking further measures to reduce the risk of accidental nuclear war, such as the jointly-manned crisis center proposed by Senators Warner and Nunn?

A. Yes. We have been in touch with the Soviets on three communications measures--joint military communications link, high-speed embassy/capital communication links, and direct communication link (hotline) upgrade. We have also raised with them the idea of a multilateral agreement to deal with attempts by private individuals or terrorist groups to acquire, threaten to use, or detonate a nuclear explosive device.

We plan to explore the communication measures further with the Soviets in discussion in Moscow on August 9-10.

We do not plan any extended discussion of the multilateral agreement with the Soviets until after we have consulted fully with our Allies.

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Q6. In a speech on June 16, Foreign Minister Gromyko stated Moscow had proposed that Soviet and American "scientific specialists get together and discuss possible implications of establishing a large-scale ABM system". Gromyko also stated that it would be a tragedy if outer space became "a sphere of military clashes".

- o How has the US responded or plan to respond to this overture?
- o Exactly how was this issue raised by Moscow and what specific issues are on the Soviet agenda? That is to say, is Moscow simply interested in discussing the implications of space-based ABM systems in a public forum as a propaganda stunt, or might they be willing to engage in a serious review of a range of issues concerning defensive strategic systems?
- o Would you find official, rather than non-official, exchanges on a range of issues relating to the development of large land- and space-based ABM systems a constructive exercise at this time? For example, in exchange for a discussion of Soviet concern about possible US space-based systems, might it be desirable to review US concern about the ABM-X-3 and the possible battle-management capabilities of the Pechora-type radars?

A. In late April Ambassador Dobrynin raised the question of a meeting of US and Soviet scientists to discuss the consequences of creating a large-scale anti-ballistic defense system with Secretary Schultz. He did not propose a more detailed agenda.

In mid-June, we told the Soviets that we assumed that their proposal was motivated by a serious concern for the longer-term implications for stability of various developments and trends in the relationship of strategic offense and defense, that long-term strategic stability depends on careful management of strategic policies and must take into account

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the inevitable progress made by both our nations in strategic systems, and that dialogue between our countries is constructive in promoting such stability.

In agreement with the point made in your question, however, we said that such issues are not primarily academic or scientific in nature, but rather involve central features of both our countries' national security policies and strategy, and that, therefore, while we were willing to discuss these questions, we strongly believed that they are more appropriately handled on a government-to-government basis. We suggested that such talks could take place in START or the SCC with delegations augmented by government experts, as needed.

It is hard to gauge Soviet seriousness; as indicated in our response to them we can only assume they are serious. If such matters were raised in the SCC, it would be appropriate to raise other issues such as those cited in your question.

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Q.7. Do you see any reason why a MIRV moratorium or pause along these lines would not be consonant with the President's START proposal, or even stand by itself as an interim accord prior to the conclusion of a comprehensive START Treaty? Indeed, wouldn't this MIRV test pause allow for the probing of Soviet willingness to undertake significant reductions in their medium and heavy ICBMs for an exchange for a halt to M-X deployment?

A. I do not believe that it would advance the START negotiations to propose a flight test moratorium on MIRVed ICBMs because it would send the wrong signal to the Soviets. The US START position does not contain any restrictions on the development of new types of medium ICBMs. To propose a moratorium on the flight testing of M-X and the SS-X-24, or as your question suggests, a halt to M-X deployment would signal the Soviets that we would be willing to trade the M-X missile for the SS-X-24. Secondly, the United States has an urgent need for a modernized ballistic missile force. During the decade of the 1970s the Soviets replaced everyone of their ICBMs with new or vastly modernized ones. The Soviets have in-place over 800 ICBMs of M-X size or layer. The M-X provides one of the key incentives for the Soviet Union to negotiate significant reductions in these forces.

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Q8. First: does Ambassador Rowny have any flexibility to explore other numbers besides 5,000 and 2,500?

A. The ceiling of 2,500 ICBM warheads contained in the US START proposal is one of the collateral constraints aimed at reducing Soviet ballistic missile throw-weight. Ambassador Rowny's instructions are to flexibly explore with the Soviets all appropriate avenues for reducing the destructive potential of ballistic missiles. Consequently, the US would be willing to accept other appropriate restraints that would result in significant reductions in the destructive ~~potential~~ of ballistic missiles in lieu of those that have already been proposed, including elimination of the 2,500 ICBM-RV subceiling. The 5,000 missile RV ceiling remains a basic element of the US proposal.

Second: is or will any consideration be given to allowing each side freedom to mix under an overall warhead ceiling as a way of taking account of the very different force structures?

A. A basic theme in the US position is that all nuclear weapons are not equal, i.e., that some pose a greater threat to stability than others. This is the basis of our view that ballistic missiles warheads, the most destabilizing type, should receive priority attention. Thus, any proposal to permit freedom to mix would undercut this view. Moreover, limiting bomber weapons in an overall mix with ballistic

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missile warheads overlooks the fact that US bomber weapons such as ALCMs and SRAMs are necessary to overcome massive Soviet air defenses which, unlike ABM defense, are unconstrained by any Treaty.

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Q10. Why no cruise missile limitations? (codeword deleted) ...
Given this country's vulnerability, because of geography and limited air defense, to Soviet sea-launched cruise missiles, can it really be argued that the limitation of these weapons is any less pressing than restraining Soviet ICBMs?

A. The Soviet Union already has deployed a large number of nuclear and conventional SLCMs on an array of platforms which can threaten the US and its operational forces. The US is developing SLCMs as a counter to the Soviet capability, as a necessary modernization of our conventional sea warfare force, and as a viable strategic reserve force. Geographic factors (i.e., the expanse of Soviet land-mass) and large Soviet air defenses, make US bomber penetration much more difficult and provide good reasons for developing and deploying cruise missiles, which have the characteristics that assure US force survivability, flexibility and penetrability. Also, cruise missiles are slower, second-strike retaliatory weapon systems which enhance deterrence and stability--unlike Soviet ICBMs which can be used in a first-strike and are highly destabilizing systems. It is for these reasons that the US seeks to focus reductions on ballistic missiles and has formulated a START proposal that takes into account the fundamental differences between fast-and slow-flying systems and limits them separately. Nevertheless, the US has proposed to limit ALCMs to 20 per bomber, and in INF to limit GLCMs to zero.

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The President has also stated that everything is on the table, and the question of limiting SLCMs in START is under study.

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Q11A. Is it true that some Allies are still interested in the walk-in-the-woods idea?

A. Both of the US proposals tabled in the Geneva INF negotiations--the zero/zero approach and the interim proposal for equal LRINF warhead levels--were developed through intensive consultations with our NATO Allies and continue to have their full backing. Support for our negotiating position has been consistently reaffirmed by NATO governments at the highest levels, most recently at the June meeting in Paris of NATO Foreign and Defense Ministers. Through the regular process of consultations, Allies are kept fully abreast of developments in the negotiations. This includes the exploratory exchanges between Ambassador Nitze and his Soviet counterpart conducted in the summer of 1982 known as the "walk-in-the-woods". The Allies are fully aware that this package was explored as a possible outcome of negotiations, not a negotiating position. All Allied governments support our current INF position.

Q11B. If they are, is the idea still alive within the US Government?

A. The US is committed to reaching an equitable settlement in the INF negotiations that addresses the security concerns which prompted NATO's 1979 decision. We believe that current US proposals for elimination of LRINF missiles or equal warhead levels represent a sound and reasonable basis for such an agreement. At the same time, the President has made clear that we will consider any serious Soviet alternative proposal which meets our criteria for a settlement.

The ideas known as the "walk-in-the-woods" were discussed by US and Soviet negotiators as a possible outcome of the negotiations; they were never intended as a US proposed starting point for further negotiations. Although we ourselves had several problems with it, we were interested in keeping this channel open. The Soviet reaction, however, was completely negative. They made it clear that an agreement that permitted US deployments, did not take into account British/French nuclear forces, and limited Soviet nuclear forces in Eastern USSR was not acceptable.